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On June 24, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea and the U.S. responded under 
the auspices of the United Nations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
General Omar Bradley said during President Harry Truman’s June 25th emergency 
meeting that the U.S. must “draw the line” for the Soviets,1 who were widely 
believed to be behind the attack.2 But this is not an article on North Korea other 
than as a key turning point in American foreign policy history, for it was the 
Korean invasion that caused the U.S. to apply the Truman Doctrine to Asia.3 The 
first non-war application of the Truman Doctrine in Asia occurred in the same two-
day period as the decision to respond to the Korean invasion, June 25-26, 1950. 
Over those 48 hours, the second topic for discussion was the fate of Formosa (since 
renamed Taiwan).  
The United States decided to send the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet to protect 
Taiwan from a Communist Chinese invasion and also to prevent the Nationalist 
government on Taiwan from continuing its attacks on the mainland. This act, the 
introduction of the Seventh Fleet into the Chinese theater, is considered the 
beginning of the U.S. policy to defend Taiwan from China.4 Since 1950, this 	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(Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1956), p. 335. 
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commitment to defend Taiwan has been seen as the largest potential cause of a 
U.S.-China war.5 Because the U.S. is a superpower and China is rising in strength, 
the Taiwan flashpoint is now considered to affect not only the U.S.’s national 
security, but the world’s international security as well.6 This policy, originating 
with the movement of the U.S. fleet in June 1950, has had significant security 
ramifications for over six decades. 
This article will answer the question: Why did the United States order the 
Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits on June 26, 1950? The analysis will be 
performed using Graham Allison’s multiple-cut system.7 The first cut will be the 
Rational Policy Model and the second cut will be the Bureaucratic Politics Model. 
The article will be broken down into four sections. First it will present a short 
overview of the policy that will be tailored to provide background information 
applicable to both models. Next it will provide a short description of each model. 
The third section will perform separate cuts on the research question and will thus 
be split into two subgroups. Finally, the article will conclude with a two-cut 
resultant answer to the question and an analysis of each model’s usefulness to the 
research question in this case. 
 
Overview of Policy 
  
This section will provide the policy background for both cuts, so it will be tailored 
to the overall strategic environment.8 The first major event was the Truman 
Doctrine’s creation. Conceived after World War II to keep European countries, 
specifically Greece and Turkey, from falling to the Soviets, Truman declared on 
March 12, 1947 that “[i]t must be the policy of the United States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
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pressures.”9 There was a discussion about whether to say, “…to support free 
peoples everywhere who…” but it was decided to remove “everywhere” so that the 
doctrine would not apply to China.10 In a Cabinet meeting on March 7, 1947, 
Truman said that he thought Chiang Kai-shek was not fit to be the leader of the 
Nationalists and that giving him any money “would be pouring sand in a rat 
hole.”11 This was the basis of the U.S. effort to aid the Nationalists (on an ad-hoc 
basis, not under the Truman Doctrine) while simultaneously seeking Chiang’s 
removal as their leader. 
 The second policy background element is the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s strategic 
assessment of Taiwan. Immediately after Dean Acheson took over as Secretary of 
State in January 1949, he revealed in a National Security Council (NSC) meeting 
that he and the State Department felt that “from a strategic point of view, China 
was an area of lower priority.”12 Acheson then asked the JCS for their assessment 
of Taiwan’s strategic priority. The JCS responded on February 10, 1949 that if 
Taiwan fell, “the extent of the threat to the security of the United States would be 
serious” and that the loss of Mainland China “would enhance the strategic value” 
of Taiwan.13 Furthermore, the JCS said that it was apparent that the U.S. had 
security interests in Asia and that protection of those interests would rest on 
controlling the sea-lanes and having locations from which to deploy air power.14 
They concluded that Taiwan must be prevented from falling into Communist 
hands, but through “diplomatic and economic steps.” 15  The JCS excluded a 
military option because their primary obligation was to defend Europe, an 
obligation soon to be codified in the North Atlantic Treaty. The JCS articulated 
this strategy-to-resource problem as follows: “In spite of Formosa’s strategic 
importance, the current disparity between our military strength and our many 
global obligations makes it inadvisable to undertake the employment of armed 
force in Formosa.”16 The JCS did recommend stationing a small number of U.S. 
Navy ships at Taiwan as a deterrent. 
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 Acheson immediately rejected any stationing of Navy ships at Taiwan.17 On 
March 4, 1949, Acheson shared the JCS conclusion – military action should not be 
used for Taiwan now or in the future – at a NSC meeting.18 The memo for this 
meeting was forwarded to Truman. This was followed by an April 4, 1949 memo 
by NSC Executive Secretary, Sidney Souers, which said the JCS confirmed, “overt 
military action by the U.S. in Formosa is not recommended either at this time or 
under any foreseeable future circumstances.”19 Obviously upset by the twisting of 
their assessment, the JCS asked Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to write to 
Souers to correct his statement – to clarify that the JCS were not recommending a 
military option because of lack of resources rather than a lack of strategic 
interest.20 This is a crucial point for the entire situation. To take action, the U.S. 
needs strategy and structure. Strategy defines the interest and structure provides the 
resources to then employ the means.21 The JCS clearly defined the strategic need, 
but they did not possess the structure, and thus recommended against military 
support. Danger arises when officials equate a lack of resources with a lack of state 
interest, as Acheson and Souers deliberately did by twisting the JCS’s assessment. 
 In August, after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, Acheson again asked 
the JCS for an assessment of Taiwan. The JCS responded on August 17, 1949 with 
a reaffirmation of their earlier view that Taiwan was important but that they did not 
have the resources to defend it from invasion, but that future circumstances could 
warrant protection. This is how the strategic situation remained until a contentious 
set of meetings in December 1949, which will be detailed in the second cut. 
The third important piece of background information is that in 1949 the U.S. 
pulled its troops out of Mainland China and South Korea.22 Keeping in mind that 
there were no troops on Taiwan, the U.S. effectively retreated from the mainland 
and the first island chain in 1949. Acheson then began to say that the defense line 
consisted of Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines.23 
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Taiwan was not just important because of strategic considerations; the U.S. 
had political and economic concerns regarding China as well. The U.S. wanted to 
retain an open-door policy with China for economic reasons while seeking to 
prevent a strategic alliance between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets.24 
The chances for either of these outcomes were essentially ruined on February 14, 
1950 when China signed the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty. Acheson was 
disturbed by this new alliance25 and George Elsey, advisor to Truman, said in an 
interview that the White House started viewing the Chinese and Soviets as being in 
a frightening world-wide Communist conspiracy.26 To make matters worse, the 
CIA reported on January 4, 1950, that it received a copy of the treaty, which 
included a secret clause that China must attack Taiwan in the spring of 1950 and 
the Soviets would enter the war if the U.S. overtly used its military to defend 
Taiwan.27 Also occurring in January was the disturbing report from Ambassador-
at-Large Philip Jessup, who had just met with Chiang in Taiwan. Jessup claimed 
that Chiang wanted to start World War III in Asia because the U.S. would be 
forced to defend Taiwan.28  
The background leading up to the policy change is fraught with complexity 
and a divergence between interests and resources. The Truman Administration was 
not prepared to support Chiang and lacked the necessary resources to apply the 
Truman Doctrine to Asia. Meanwhile, the State Department had been holding out 
hope for a Sino-Soviet split to retain economic ties with China only to see that 
hope logically destroyed by the Friendship Treaty, which was really a defense 
treaty and operational invasion plan in disguise. All of this combined with 
Chiang’s desire for World War III will provide the background for the first half of 
1950 and the lead up to the policy decision in June. 
 
Description of Two Models 
  
The first cut will be viewed through the lens of Model I – the Rational Policy 
Model (RPM)29 – and the second cut will be Model III – the Bureaucratic Politics 	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Model (BPM).30 The best way to initially differentiate between the two models is 
through the example that Allison uses: that of a chess match. In the Rational Policy 
Model, one chess player is moving all of the team’s pieces to win the game, while 
in the Bureaucratic Politics Model, numerous players with their own goals share 
power through bargaining to move the team’s pieces.31 The major difference 
between Models I and III is the level of analysis – state as actor, or individual 
players as actors. 
The RPM, as the name would suggest, is underpinned by the assumption of 
state rationality. Allison defines rationality as “consistent, value-maximizing 
choice[s] within specific constraints.”32 By assuming the state is rational in seeking 
to achieve its objectives, this simple model can infer the state’s objectives from its 
behavior.33 This assumption is what makes the RPM so prevalent in analysis and 
scholarly circles – behavior is generally observable and assumptions of rationality 
provide the ability to draw conclusions on state objectives. This is why Allison 
asserts that the RPM has “significant explanatory power.”34 
 The unit of analysis for the RPM is a unified rational actor as a decision-
maker.35 This actor is generally considered to be the head of state (or top decision-
making authority as applicable) and is the embodiment of state goals and actions. 
The analysis is conducted in four steps: determine state goals and objectives, 
determine alternative courses of action (COA), conduct a cost-benefit analysis for 
each COA, and then determine the most value-maximizing decision 36  In a 
historical study, such as this essay, this model can focus on the decision that was 
made as the rational resultant, or it can assess the decision to determine if it was in 
fact the value-maximizing choice. This study, being a two-cut study and with the 
added benefit of additional historical information, will assess the rationality of 
sending the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits. 
 The second cut, performed using the BPM, has the strength of going deeper 
into the situation and making assessments at a more granular level.37 This level of 
analysis is not without cost, however; the amount of information and time required 	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to conduct it is generally prohibitive.38 In this case, with a policy question that 
occurred over 60 years ago, there is enough information to conduct a BPM 
analysis. 
 The BPM’s focus is not on the state as unitary actor, but on numerous 
players that interact in a competitive game of politics to achieve their own ends 
and with the final state behavior being the outcome of this process.39 The BPM is 
less formal or structured than the RPM, and it also analyzes the situation through a 
more fluid lens. For the individual players, it is their own power and the action 
channels that matter, not the formal organizational charts.40 In short, players are 
defined by their effectiveness in influencing policy based solely on how they play 
the game, not in their position or organization hierarchy, and their power fluctuates 
based on time and topic. 
 The unit of analysis for the BPM is “governmental actions as political 
resultant.”41 From political resultant comes a focus on the politics. Allison looks at 
politics as being conducted by players that are in a role, and their relative influence 
is based on their power to achieve their objectives.42 Power, defined by Allison, is 
the ability to influence the outcome.43 The BPM’s analytical structure is more in 
the form of a narrative than the RPM. It seeks to describe the entire political game 
– organized through action channels and participated in by players with their own 
goals – and then determine how the resultant policy was reached.44 One other 
major difference is that there is no assumption that the head of state is the decision 
maker.45 This model demands more information and more time, but it can yield a 
result that is more refined than the RPM, and sometimes contradictory to the RPM 
analysis. 
 Finally, it is important to recognize the benefits of doing two cuts on a single 
research question. Most studies only use one theory with one set of assumptions, 
strengths, and weaknesses that can be recognized and, ideally, controlled for. 
Allison argues that because all models simplify through assumptions, it is better to 
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use multiple cuts to counteract each model’s weaknesses and ultimately end up 
with a more accurate set of findings.46 
 
Histories of the Policy  
 
Model I: Rational Policy Model 
A. Goals and Objectives 
The U.S. had a contradictory and confused set of goals immediately prior to the 
North Korean invasion and the Seventh Fleet being ordered to Taiwan. After the 
Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty was signed, there was still hope that divergent 
interests between China and the Soviets would destroy their alliance.47  This 
objective of wait-and-see was challenged by the CIA and State Department reports 
published nearly every month from January to April 1950, which explained that the 
Friendship Treaty would be solid for the next few years, that it included a Soviet-
defense agreement, and that the Soviets were sending military advisors, bombers, 
and submarines to assist with the invasion of Taiwan.48 The next question was 
whether to apply the Truman Doctrine to Asia. 
 Truman made a speech in January 1950 in which he announced that he 
would not defend Taiwan with military force and that the U.S. would prepare for 
the strategic impact of its loss.49 The President made it clear that the Truman 
Doctrine did not apply to Asia. But as the next few months went on, it appears that 
this objective was reconsidered. With the Chinese signing and strengthening of the 
aforementioned Friendship Treaty and the subsequent evaluation of a worldwide 
Communist conspiracy, Truman seems to have changed U.S. objectives to 
containment of Communism in Asia and the establishment of a defense line at the 
first island chain. The question was how to accomplish this while knowing the 
Soviets would go to war if the U.S. actively defended Taiwan, which would start 
World War III. 
 Preventing World War III was another primary goal. On October 19, 1949, 
the CIA concluded that directly supporting Taiwan was the only way to defend it 
from almost-certain invasion, but doing so could “conceivabl[y] precipitate World 	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War III.”50 This is what Truman struggled with when he made his emergency flight 
back to Washington after the Korean invasion. Sitting on the plane, Truman 
struggled with the need to prevent a global war in the present, but he was also 
concerned about the increased threat of World War III occurring in the future if the 
U.S. did not respond. Truman saw this situation with Taiwan (and Korea) as 
synonymous with the early Nazi invasions of surrounding countries, and he wanted 
to avoid the sort of appeasement that had failed to contain Adolf Hitler’s regime.51 
He also understood that the U.S. was considered to be a protector of Taiwan, even 
if unofficially, and that if he let Taiwan (or Korea) fall then other states in Europe 
and elsewhere would question U.S. credibility.52 This resulted in a U.S. goal of 
responding to the Communist threat by containing it while trying to prevent a 
descent into war with the Soviets and Chinese, simultaneously looking to prevent 
World War III in the future.  
Finally, with the strategy established, there was the question of structure. As 
the JCS had been clearly arguing for over a year, there was a disconnection 
between military resources and U.S. global obligations. Truman understood this 
and wisely stated in his memoirs that a nation can only do what it is resourced to 
do, and that begins with its citizens:53  
 
In 1945-46 the American people had chosen to scuttle their military 
might. I was against hasty and excessive demobilization at the time 
and stated publicly that I was, and General Eisenhower, then Army 
Chief of Staff, spoke out against it also. The press and the Congress, 
however, drowned us out.54 
 
There were simply not enough resources to send a large number of forces to Korea 
and to Taiwan to contain the Communists. Additionally, there was a concern that 
the Soviets’ direction of the Korean invasion, and the Friendship Treaty’s 
stipulation of a Taiwanese invasion, was precisely intended to make the U.S. move 
its small, demobilized military to Asia and thus leave Europe undefended. The 
fear, especially given the U.S.’s 1949 troop withdrawals from Korea and China, 
was that Asia was a Soviet diversion.55 	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B. Alternatives (Course of Action) 
1. Follow Truman’s January 1950 statement, do nothing, and let China 
invade. 
 2. Send Naval Forces to the Taiwan Straits, neutralize area. 
 3. Send Naval Forces to the Taiwan Straits, do not neutralize the area. 
 4. Send U.S. ground, air, and naval forces to Taiwan to defend it. 
 
C. Consequences  
Course of Action (COA) 1 would have been the easiest for the U.S. because 
Truman could have focused on only the Korean invasion. It is always more 
difficult to prosecute two conflicts or military operations simultaneously. Also, 
Truman could attempt to justify this COA from a credibility standpoint because the 
U.S. previously protected Korea but had no such official relationship with Taiwan. 
Additionally, not sending forces to Taiwan was more in line with current military 
force levels and also ensured that more of a reserve that could be left in Europe to 
respond to Soviet aggression. The costs of this COA would be an almost certain 
invasion of Taiwan based on the Friendship Treaty and the subsequent loss of a 
key island in the U.S. defense chain. Additionally, this island could be used to 
attack U.S. forces in Korea and the Philippines, and to disrupt U.S. interests in 
controlling the Pacific sea-lanes.  
 COA 2 takes the next step in the escalation spectrum, the introduction of 
U.S. Naval forces between China and Taiwan with a neutralization of Nationalist 
attacks on the mainland. This approach allows the U.S. to attempt to stop an almost 
certain invasion from the Chinese and Soviets and thus attempts to keep Taiwan 
from falling into Communist hands. Second, by making the approach 
“neutralization” instead of defense, the U.S. could try to avoid the Soviet 
assistance clause in the Friendship Treaty. Additionally, the neutralization would 
serve to also stop Chiang from attacking the mainland, which would risk escalating 
the situation. This is especially important because of Chiang’s statements of 
wanting to start World War III. This approach would also allow the U.S. to 
continue to try to remove Chiang from office rather than supporting him. The 
negatives of this approach are that the Seventh Fleet could not guarantee that the 
Chinese would not invade, and then the U.S. would be forced to defend itself and 
thus enter a war with the Chinese and likely the Soviets. This would be a war that 
the U.S. would not have sufficient forces to execute without dangerously depriving 
Europe of U.S. defense. 
 COA 3 is like the second except it does not neutralize the area; it takes no 
action to stop Nationalist attacks on the mainland. The benefits of this approach, in 
addition to the ones for COA 2, are that it would keep Chinese forces engaged in 
defending against Nationalist hit and run attacks and thus render them unable to 
move forces north into the Korean theater. The costs of this approach would be 
more significant than COA 2. With U.S. forces in the Taiwan Straits, any attack by 
the Nationalists would be considered sanctioned by the U.S. The reason is the 
Navy would be stopping Chinese attacks in one direction but clearly allowing 
Nationalist attacks in the other. This would greatly increase the chances of bringing 
China into the war, and if seen as a U.S. provocation it could also bring in the 
Soviets. Additionally, Nationalist attacks would probably not have a significant 
chance of destroying the Communist Chinese state, so they would serve no purpose 
in that regard. 
 COA 4 is essentially a full defense of Taiwan. The benefits of this approach 
would be its clear message of containment to the Communists and a demonstrated 
willingness to defend Taiwan. This would also send a message to other U.S. 
protectorates that the U.S. will honor its defense commitments. The final benefit is 
that a show-of-strength on Taiwan could serve as a deterrent to a Chinese invasion. 
There are numerous costs to this approach. First, if the Chinese did invade, it 
would almost certainly lead to war with the Soviets because of the Friendship 
Treaty. Second, the U.S. would have to transfer troops from Europe, which would 
open that theater up to Soviet invasion. Third, using troops in Taiwan for a 
possible invasion would take forces away from responding to the active invasion in 
Korea. Fourth, by committing to Taiwan, and thus depriving any strategic reserve, 
the U.S. would leave itself vulnerable to Communist attacks on other island chain 
nations or in Southeast Asia. 
 
D. Decision 
On June 25 and 26, 1950, Truman chose COA 2 and sent the Seventh Fleet into the 
Taiwan Straits to protect it from invasion and neutralize the area. Additionally, 
Truman said that the next step was to remove Chiang.56 Then the President worked 
to rebuild the U.S. military, starting with extending the draft, which Congress 
passed on June 27th.57  
 Using the benefit of time and numerous primary and secondary sources, it is 
clear from the first cut that Truman made the most rational decision. By 
introducing the Seventh Fleet he defended Taiwan, could still work to remove 
Chiang, and then built up the military to apply the Truman Doctrine to Asia while 
still meeting his numerous other global defense commitments. 
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Having established that Truman made the most rational decision in sending the 
Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits, this cut will seek to analyze the process that 
led to Truman’s decision, and to see if he did in fact make it himself. It will be 
more fluid than the first cut, but it will generally follow a format of identifying the 
major action channel, the key players and their goals, and then the process to reach 
the policy. 
 The major action channel in the policy process was the National Security 
Council. Created in 1947, Truman used it to develop options for him to decide on. 
He wrote in his memoirs, “I used the National Security Council (NSC) only as a 
place for recommendations to be worked out. Like the Cabinet, the Council does 
not make decisions. The policy itself has to come down from the President, as all 
final decisions have to be made by him.”58 He added that nothing is policy until the 
President makes a decision in writing.59 To direct the NSC Truman relied on his 
Secretary of State—this was before the creation of the National Security Advisor—
to lead the meetings and determine recommendations to be forwarded for decision. 
Truman wrote in his memoirs, “the Secretary of State makes the final 
recommendation of policy, and the President makes the final decision.” Truman set 
up his action channel to make sure that he made the decision, but he gave a 
significant amount of power to Secretary of State Dean Acheson as the person who 
essentially ran the NSC and framed the recommendations for Truman’s decisions.   
In addition to Truman’s standing expectation that the Secretary of State would play 
a central role, Truman made Acheson the official coordinator of all Taiwan policy 
on February 28, 1949.60 Any change in the Taiwan policy had to first go through 
Acheson. It would be fair to say that in the Seventh Fleet policy decision, Acheson 
had equal if not greater power than Truman. 
 This section will analyze each player’s individual policy stances and goals 
leading up to December 1949. December 1949 is when critical meetings occurred 
that set off the chain of events that led up to the June 25 and 26, 1950 policy 
meetings. The first player analyzed will be Dean Acheson. It was demonstrated in 
the policy overview section that he was not in favor of a military defense of 
Taiwan when he misrepresented the JCS’s strategic assessments. Additionally, 
being in charge of the NSC, he was the player that would be expected to go to 
Truman and say that the JCS had determined that Taiwan was as an important 
strategic interest that the U.S. should defend, but that the military could not defend 
it without more resources. By not fighting for additional defense spending, 	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Acheson demonstrated his view that China was a minor issue for the U.S. and the 
military should not be positioned there. 
 Acheson had further political goals as well. He believed that before the U.S. 
could effectively support Taiwan, Chiang had to be removed.61 He was also 
convinced that if the U.S. just waited, the Chinese and Soviets would develop a 
rift.62 If the U.S. was unable to remove Chiang and the Chinese invaded, he felt 
that it would be better to let Taiwan go and to deal with the strategic 
consequences.63 As 1949 was coming to a close, Acheson was seeking ways to 
remove Chiang, and if the Chinese invaded then he planned to simply live with it. 
 As discussed in the JCS assessment, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
opposed Acheson’s view. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson wanted more money 
for Taiwanese defense,64 as did Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
Omar Bradley. Bradley also supported stationing ships at Taiwan in its defense, a 
proposal that had been previously rejected by Acheson.65 Finally, Commander of 
Japan (who had authority over “the China area,” which included Taiwan) General 
Douglas MacArthur had been vocally lobbying for the direct defense of Taiwan 
due to its critical strategic value.66 None of the top three military members 
appeared to be able to convince Acheson to recommend to Truman any of their 
goals leading up to December 1949. 
 The final major sets of players are the China Bloc, China Lobby, and the 
McCarthyites. The China Bloc was a group of mainly Republican Senators and 
Congressmen who clashed with Truman and Acheson on the U.S.’s China policy. 
According to reports of their statements, one of their major goals was to criticize 
the administration in order to help their reelection campaigns in November 1950.67 
The China Lobby was made up of hired interests groups, Christian missionaries, 
businessmen, and those unhappy with Truman’s foreign policy.68 Historians Jack 
Anderson and Ronald May write, “[f]ew other lobbies ever exerted such relentless 
pressure on American foreign and domestic policy.”69 The McCarthyites for this 	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article will be dealt with in conjunction with the China Bloc and analyzed in the 
next section. The China Bloc’s goal was to win reelection, and the China Lobby’s 
goal was to change the administration’s policy to actively defend Taiwan and to 
retain economic access to China (to a degree, access was the China Bloc’s goal as 
well).  
 With the goals established, this section will describe the political process 
that went into making the decision to deploy the Seventh Fleet. In December of 
1949, Johnson asked Acheson for additional money to defend Taiwan. Acheson 
objected because he had already given “the China area” money to Korea, 
Indochina, and the Philippines. Johnson, becoming angry at this news, replied that 
the JCS agreed with him and he wanted the money diverted to Taiwan.70 A few 
days later on December 23rd, Bradley sent a proposal to the NSC for a new military 
policy for Taiwan. It included a modest military training and advisor program 
combined with increased political and economic programs.71 Acheson’s Assistant 
Secretary of State for the Far East rejected it within 24 hours.72 
This led to a contentious debate, detailed in McGlothlen’s Controlling the 
Waves, between the State Department and the DOD on December 29, 1949. 
Bradley argued that he was in favor of the military program even if it only 
postponed the Nationalist government’s collapse because it would prevent a 
Chinese invasion in the interim. Acheson retorted that the military would fail and it 
would damage the U.S.’s prestige. It was at this point that Johnson, fed up with 
Acheson’s stonewalling, stormed out of the room. 73  The remainder of the 
meeting’s record comes from Acheson’s notes. Acheson wrote in a Memorandum 
of Conversation that he argued: 
 
We must also face the certainty that throughout Southeast Asia the 
Communists will seek to extend their domination, probably though 
subversive methods and not invasion. We must do our utmost to 
strengthen the neighbors of China. What we have to do is build up 
their capacity.74  
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Additionally, he maintained that the U.S. should wait for the inevitable China-
Soviet split and that if the U.S. were to defend Taiwan militarily it would provide 
grounds for Communist propaganda charges of U.S. imperialism. Bradley 
responded that if he understood correctly, Acheson was prepared to let Taiwan fall 
for political reasons, to which Acheson answered, “I was inclined to regard the 
political price as too high to pay for the purchase of some additional time.”75 
A few days later, on January 4, 1950, the CIA issued an intelligence report 
detailing the Friendship Treaty’s invasion mandate and the Soviets’ promise of 
military support against overt American defense of Taiwan.76 After reading the 
report, Acheson convinced Truman that the best way to get ahead of the Taiwan 
issue was to give a speech to settle the policy for good.77 Truman held a news 
conference on January 5th in which he said: 
 
The United States has … no desire to obtain special rights or 
privileges, or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor 
does it have any intention of utilizing its Armed Forces to interfere in 
the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a 
course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. 
Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid 
or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.78 
 
Truman’s declaration that the U.S. would not defend Taiwan started a massive 
controversy in Washington.79 Acheson met with the China Bloc that same day to 
explain. He said that the U.S. should not defend Taiwan because Bradley did not 
consider it a “vital interest” and because it would open the U.S. to propaganda as 
an imperialist state.80 Sarkesian et al. defines a vital interest as one which a state 
will deploy its military to defend.81 Using this definition, it is clear that Acheson 
was again misrepresenting the spirit of Bradley’s assessment. Bradley said that he 
could not make Taiwan a vital interest due to a lack of troops, not a lack of 	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strategic interest. The China Bloc completely disagreed with Acheson and said this 
could “affect [the] future attitude of support of a bipartisan foreign policy.”82  
 Following that meeting, the China Bloc summoned Acheson to appear 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 10th and the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on January 11th. At these hearings, Acheson blamed the 
decision to not defend Taiwan on Chiang’s incompetence and said that the defense 
perimeter only included Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. He excluded 
Taiwan, which was not in line with what Bradley, MacArthur, and Johnson had 
been saying for years. Again the China Bloc was not satisfied.83  
 On February 9th, Joseph McCarthy made his famous speech alleging that 
there were Communist agents in the State Department, and specifically in the Far 
East section, which was why the U.S. had surrendered Taiwan.84  McCarthy’s 
charge put even more pressure on Acheson. A week later on February 17th, the CIA 
issued a new report that predicted there would not be a China-Soviet split for at 
least a few years.85 Then in March the Nationalists began a blockade of the 
Mainland and bombing its ports.86 Amidst the Nationalist actions, the China Bloc, 
and McCarthy, Acheson had to do something. 
 Acheson responded by convincing Dean Rusk to leave his position as the 
fourth highest-ranked man in the State Department to take over as Director of the 
State Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Acheson hoped that Rusk’s appointment would 
mollify the China Bloc and McCarthy; and in the process, Rusk became Acheson’s 
most influential advisor on Taiwan.87 There is no evidence, however, that Rusk’s 
appointment had any influence on the China Bloc or McCarthy. 
 In April the CIA released a report reaffirming its prediction of a Communist 
invasion of Taiwan by the end of 1950.88 This was followed quickly by an April 
13th memo to Acheson from State personnel in Taiwan that there was conclusive 
proof of Soviet fighter planes staged to assist in the Taiwan invasion.89 Just days 
later on April 16th-17th, China invaded the Nationalist stronghold on the nearby 
island of Hainan.90 Within a week Acheson received another memo from State 	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personnel in Taiwan that there were Soviet subs in the Taiwan Straits.91 All 
expectations were that the Chinese and Soviets would invade Taiwan within the 
next few months. 
 Dean Rusk decided to conduct a study on the best way to approach the 
Taiwan problem. After completing a report that has been compared to a 
dissertation, he settled on one recommendation among numerous analyzed policy 
options.92 Rusk recommended a policy of using the American military to neutralize 
Taiwan until the Japanese peace treaty or the United Nations could install a new 
government there. He analyzed two courses of action to achieve this policy. The 
first was offering military assistance under the conditions that Chiang would 
resign, all Nationalist attacks on the mainland would cease, and the U.S. would get 
to pick the interim leaders until the UN could oversee the installation of a new 
permanent government. The second course of action was to send the Seventh Fleet 
to Taiwan and then orchestrate a coup. Rusk recommended the coup.93  
 At a meeting on the morning of May 30th, Rusk met with the State Office of 
Intelligence and Research to discuss his study. He made a statement that Taiwan 
“presents a plausible place to ‘draw the line’ and is, in itself, important politically 
if not strategically, for what it represents in continued Communist expansion.”94 
Later that day Rusk met with Acheson to present his report and recommendations. 
There is no evidence from this meeting, but Rusk was reported to have said that the 
situation dictated that action needed to be taken quickly. Acheson then told Rusk 
that he would take the recommendations to Truman to be considered.95 Acheson 
met with Truman every Monday and Thursday, and talked with him by phone 
almost every day.96 Truman was likely aware of Rusk’s recommendations within 
24 hours. 
There is no evidence whether Truman, Acheson, or the NSC discussed or 
began implementing one of Rusk’s recommendations prior to June 24th. Almost all 
assessments say that the Korean invasion was the moment when the Taiwan policy 
changed.97 Even the editor of the FRUS expresses this.98 But is it really true? After 	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the Korean invasion, Truman met with all of the major players from State and 
Defense in the Blair House for what was essentially a wartime NSC meeting. The 
State contingent included Rusk and DOD’s was made up of the Secretary and all of 
the Joint Chiefs. Acheson took charge of the meeting at Truman’s request99 and 
began by reading MacArthur’s June 14, 1950 memo that assessed Taiwan as 
strategically important and recommended an immediate military survey team be 
sent there to assess the necessary requirements for establishing a military 
defense. 100  After discussing Korea, Truman turned to Taiwan. Acheson 
recommended that the Seventh Fleet be sent there to neutralize the area until a UN 
settlement could be reached to remove Chiang.101 This recommendation was a 
combination of Rusk’s two courses of action. Truman decided instead to order the 
fleet to sail towards Japan from the Philippines. It would take two days to get to 
either location, so Truman had 24 hours to decide whether to send the fleet to 
Japan (to support Korea) or to Taiwan.102  
On the night of June 26th the same group met again in the Blair House. 
Acheson led the meeting, and this time he said that the U.S. could not afford a 
Chinese invasion of Taiwan. In his biography of Acheson, James Chace argues that 
once Truman decided to defend Korea, Acheson could not justify letting Taiwan be 
invaded.103 But “justify” to whom? The most likely conclusion is the China Bloc 
and China Lobby. While it cannot be determined if they had caused Acheson to 
change his mind, in June and throughout the beginning of 1950 they clearly had 
some independent effect on the Taiwan policy. So at that second meeting, Acheson 
recommended to Truman that the Seventh Fleet be sent into the Taiwan Straits to 
neutralize the area – to prevent a Chinese invasion and to prevent further 
Nationalist attacks on the mainland. Agreeing with Acheson, Truman issued the 
order and explained that the next step after neutralization was replacing Chiang.104 
The evidence indicates that the policy Acheson recommended to Truman was Dean 
Rusk’s revised policy from his May 30th report and that this policy was a 
combination of Rusk’s two alternatives. When this is considered along with 
Truman’s quick declaration that removing Chiang was the next step, it supports the 
conclusion that when the Korean War started, Truman and Acheson were already 	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considering Rusk’s policy recommendation. The Korean War did not cause the 
Taiwan policy change; Rusk’s report did. The war only sped up the timetable for 
implementation. 
The Bureaucratic Politics Model’s more refined level of analysis provides 
many new illuminating details about the decision to send the Seventh Fleet to 
Taiwan. First, Truman clearly made the decision. Second, any decision Truman 
made on Taiwan, whether in June 1950, or all the way back to when Acheson took 
over the State Department in January 1949, was framed and communicated by 
Acheson. If Acheson was not convinced by a proposal, as he was not with Bradley, 
Johnson, and MacArthur’s recommendation for military assistance, it never went 
to Truman for consideration. Third, the final decision to send the fleet and 
neutralize the area can be traced back to Dean Rusk’s May recommendation to 
modify U.S. policy. This model answers the question by demonstrating that the 
U.S. sent the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan based on Truman’s decision, but through an 




The decision to send the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits in June 1950 has had 
far-reaching effects on U.S. and international security. Taiwan is still considered a 
flashpoint between the U.S. and China, and this article attempts to determine how 
this vital U.S. policy decision was made. It did so through the use of Allison’s 
multiple-cut approach made up of the Rational Policy Model followed by the 
Bureaucratic Politics Model. As Allison argues, combining the resultants of the 
two approaches produces a much more valuable answer than using only one. The 
resultant answer is that Truman made the rational strategic decision to implement a 
U.S. policy of protecting Taiwan with the Seventh Fleet, which was framed and 
recommended to him by Acheson, and developed through an extensive study by 
Rusk in April and May of 1950.  
 This is a research question for which both approaches worked well in 
complement. Model I established the rationality of Truman’s decision based on the 
strategic environment while Model III described the political process to get to the 
policy. If one model had to be selected as the superior in this case, it would be 
Model III for three reasons. First, the process, and specifically Rusk’s in-depth 
assessment, provides evidence that this critical and far-reaching policy was not 
decided within 48 hours of the Korean invasion – as is often stated – but was 
studied and considered for months prior. Second, Model III provides evidence that, 
if Acheson would have allowed the Defense Department to make the case for 
protecting Taiwan, it is possible that the U.S. military presence would have served 
as a deterrent that would have prevented the Friendship Treaty from including 
plans for a 1950 invasion and for Soviet intervention. The Soviets likely would 
have wanted to prevent World War III just as the U.S. did. A large portion of the 
headaches associated with Taiwan in 1949 and 1950 could likely have been 
prevented if Acheson was more neutral in his influential position on the NSC. This 
leads to the third point Acheson’s clear preference for politics over strategic 
interest on the NSC supports the creation of a neutral National Security Advisor to 
ensure the President is hearing both the political and military sides of every 
national security policy dilemma. 105  Taiwan will remain a critical flashpoint 
between the U.S. and China for the foreseeable future, but this article finds that the 
origination of U.S. policy to protect Taiwan was the most rational choice, made by 
Truman, communicated by Acheson, and created in a deliberative dissertation-
quality study by Rusk. 
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